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SOLIPSISM AND THE GRASPABILITY OF FACT 
Abstract 
Wittgenstein’s Tractarian discussion of solipsism opens with the claim that ‘[t]he limits of my 
language mean the limits of the world’ (TLP 5.6.) According to this paper, Wittgenstein 
expresses here a thought that the subject makes no sense of her thinking having content 
going beyond in kind that which she possesses in thinking. What the subject possesses in 
thinking is furthermore a truth or falsity, so that the idea is ruled out of truth-independent 
substance to the world. At the same time, however, thinking is an act of the subject given to 
her only as such – only as something she does, and so only as a determination of herself. 
Truth is not therefore independent of the subject; rather, as Wittgenstein puts it, ‘the world 
is my world’ (TLP 5.62). This conclusion threatens an idealism under which the nature of truth 
is explained by reference to that of the subject; objectivity is grounded in a deeper 
subjectivity. This threat is deflected by the recognition that the solipsist’s subject is an 
essentially undistanceable ‘I’ without content or character, so that ‘solipsism strictly carried 
out coincides with pure realism’ (TLP 5.64). 
INTRODUCTION 
At the start of his Tractarian discussion of solipsism, Wittgenstein sets out in two sections 
how the solipsist is in a certain manner correct: 
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. 
5.62 This remark provides the key to the question, in what way solipsism is a truth. 
In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows 
itself. 
The world is my world: this shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the 
language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.1 
Between these two is section 5.61 which stands apart from its immediate neighbours by 
making no use of the first person singular, and with that by bearing no obvious connection to 
solipsism: 
5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.  
We cannot therefore say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that’.  
For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this 
cannot be the case since it would require logic to go beyond the limits of the world: 
that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also.  
What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot 
think.  
The history of the passage’s composition marks 5.61 as an intruder. The ancestors of 5.6 and 
5.62 in the Notebooks have nothing intervening correlating to 5.61. And the solipsism 
passage of Prototractatus is a sentence by sentence match with that of the Tractatus, apart 
1 I shall throughout be using the Ogden translation of the Tractatus. 
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from the absence of any correlate to 5.61 whose content appears later on. (The words ‘This 
remark’ at the start of 5.62 unquestionably refer not to 5.61 but to 5.6.) At some late stage of 
the book’s composition, Wittgenstein decided that the apparently impersonal comments of 
5.61, comments which had initially been placed elsewhere, should be relocated to join the 
first personal discussion of 5.6 and 5.62.  
In this essay, I shall seek to understand Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism by 
considering first section 5.61. Subsequently I shall turn to sections 5.6 and 5.62. Finally, in 
the third part of the essay, I shall consider central themes of the 5.63s and 5.64s. It’s not 
obvious up front that this strategy will be fruitful. Just because 5.61 was originally separated 
from 5.6 and 5.62 doesn’t mean an understanding of it will be available independently of 
these sections. Similarly, the fact that 5.6 and 5.62 precede the 5.63s and 5.64s provides no 
guarantee that an interpretation can be successful which examines them in that order. But 
still, let’s see what we can do. 
 
 




The limits of logic are the limits of the world. What does this mean?  
The Tractarian world is the totality of facts (TLP 1, 1.1), and so it might be thought 
momentarily that by the limits of the world, Wittgenstein will mean the boundary between 
the facts and the non-facts, the boundary between the actual and the non-actual. Evidently, 
though, this is not Wittgenstein’s intention. There is no concern in 5.61, or indeed anywhere 
in the 5.6s, with a contingent divide between what is so and what is not. The effect of 
Wittgenstein’s talk of limits, rather, is to signal a concern with something non-contingent, 
namely the space comprising indifferently both what is so and what is not. It signals a 
concern, that is to say, with the space of the possible. Talk of limits has a similar effect in 
application also to logic or language. Here again consideration is moved away from any 
contingent, empirical totality of propositions – the propositions of English, say, or of 
Japanese – and moved on to the non-contingent matter simply of what may be said. 
Wittgenstein is concerned, that is to say, not with any empirically circumscribed set of 
propositions, but with the non-contingent space of the sayable, the space of sense. 
Wittgenstein’s identification of the limits of logic and the limits of the world is thus a re-
expression of the Tractarian theme, familiar from elsewhere, that ‘what is thinkable is also 
possible’ (TLP 3.02) and vice versa.  
But what is the theme? What does the identification mean? Let’s begin towards an 
answer to this question by considering something Wittgenstein doesn’t intend by the 
identification, namely a proposal that sense and possibility are identical in extent. And for 
this, it will be useful to talk in terms of ‘object-combinations’. A possibility for Wittgenstein is 
a possible way for things to be, where in the basic, atomic case this is a possible object-
combination, a possibility that certain objects stand together in a certain manner. Similarly, a 
sense is a thinkable way for things to be, a way things can be thought to be, where in the 
elementary case this is a thinkable object-combination. A thinkable object-combination, 
Wittgenstein thus holds, is also a possible object-combination. So expressed, however, the 
position is liable to be misunderstood. Specifically, it is liable to be miscast as a thesis that 
representability and possibility co-extend within a more general space of object-
combination, a thesis held against an alternative that sense is wider in extent within that 
space than possibility. 
 A disagreement as to whether thinkability extends beyond possibility could take the 
form either of a disagreement about the extent of thinkability, or of a disagreement about 
the extent of possibility. If Wittgenstein were to hold a thesis that what is thinkable is also 
possible, his opponent could be someone who overestimates sense, maintaining that certain 
impossible object-combinations are thinkable. Or his opponent could be someone who 
underestimates possibility, maintaining that certain thinkable combinations are impossible. 
Either way, we may however note, Wittgenstein’s entering into a disagreement with the 
opponent will mean his allowing the specification of an object-combination which is not as 
such the specification of a possibility. In the second case, Wittgenstein allows sense to his 
opponent’s view that certain specifiable object-combinations are impossible. And in the first, 
Wittgenstein himself specifies impossible object-combinations, maintaining against his 
opponent that such things cannot be thought. It is evident from what Wittgenstein goes on 
to say in 5.61, however, that the specification of an impossible object combination is not to 
be countenanced: 
 
We cannot therefore say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that’.  
For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this 
cannot be the case since it would require logic to go beyond the limits of the world. 
(5.61) 
 
There is no saying that this combination is a possibility, and this, but not that. For that would 
mean excluding certain combinations from possibility, or certain would-be possibilities from 
being genuine. And for this we would need logic to go beyond the limits of the world. 
 Not only, then, does Wittgenstein reject the idea of specifying an object-
combination whilst leaving it open whether that combination is possible, he further explains 
that rejection as a consequence of the identity of limits between logic and the world. 
Transparently, we need a different understanding of that identity, one which does not 
construe it as a thesis about the relative extents of representability and possibility within a 
space of object-combinations. 
 
1.2 
Let’s look back to Wittgenstein’s opening remarks in his book on the combining of objects. 
Wittgenstein introduces his notion of an object with the statement: 
 









2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs. 
 
The range of possible facts, the space of possibility, is implicit within the essential nature of 
the Tractarian objects. This idea that combinatorial potential is contained within the nature of 
the objects bears, however, two rather different understandings. It can be understood as the 
stance that an object’s possibilities for combining in facts are a product of its essential 
nature. The object’s combinatorial possibilities are grounded in its essential nature, much as 
the essential natures of certain geometrical shapes ground their possibilities together for 
tessellation. Or it can be understood as a view that the object’s essential nature consists in its 
combinatorial possibilities, that the combinatorial powers are written into the object at the 
start as constitutive of its essential nature. In his ensuing comments, Wittgenstein repeatedly 
rejects the former view and asserts the latter: 
 
2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic fact, the 
possibility of the atomic fact must be prejudged in the thing. 
2.0121 It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist 
alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit. 
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them. … 
Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects 
apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its 
connexion with other things. 
… 
2.0123 If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in 
atomic facts. 
(Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object.) 
A new possibility cannot subsequently be found. 
 
There is no having an object in view and then subsequently considering what possibilities it 
has for combination, no ‘finding out’ as a ‘kind of accident’ that this is a way the object can 
combine. Rather, what an object essentially is, Wittgenstein insists, is a possible part of facts. 
 It is a straightforward consequence of this conception of objects that the idea of an 
impossible object-combination, a combination which ‘goes against the natures of the entities 
there combining’ is incoherent. Nothing is specified by ‘these objects, in this way, where this 
is not a way these can combine’. On Wittgenstein’s conception of an object, to speak of 
certain objects combining is to speak of a certain joint potential being actual. And it is 
immediately incoherent, immediate nonsense, to talk of potential being actual in a manner 
which is not an actualization of that potential. (Consider by comparison the idea of a ‘chess 
move in which a castle goes diagonally’. Whilst pieces of wood can of course be physically 
relocated anywhere on a board, a chess piece is understood only by reference to its 
potential for chess movement, so that the idea is straightforwardly incoherent of a chess 
castle moving diagonally.) The stance expressed in 5.61 that we cannot say in logic that the 
world has this in it but not that, and explained there as issuing from the identity of limits 
between logic and the world, is thus a consequence of what appears earlier in the book as a 
certain priority of facts over objects. It is dictated by that priority that an object-combination 
is as such a possibility. 
 
1.3 
So there must be a close link between Wittgenstein’s conception of fact and object and the 
identity of limits between logic and the world. With this in mind, let’s ask after the source of 
the conception. Where does the idea come from of objects as essentially and exhaustively 
possible parts of facts? Why should that be a basic structuring of reality? Here I’m going to 
present what for now will appear a dogmatic account. There will be considerably more 
discussion as the essay progresses. 
Frege writes: 
 
What is distinctive about my conception of logic is that I begin by giving pride of place 
to the content of the word ‘true’, and then immediately go on to introduce a thought as 
that to which the question ‘Is it true?’ is in principle applicable. So I do not begin with 
concepts and put them together to form a thought or judgement; I come by the parts of 
a thought by analyzing the thought. (Frege 1979: 253) 
 
This distinctive Fregean conception of logic is also, I suggest, that of the Tractatus. Like 
Frege, Wittgenstein gives pride of place to truth, and introduces a fact, or way for things to 
be, or an object-combination, as that to which the question ‘Is it true?’ has application. A fact 
is something which may obtain or not, and such obtaining is the matter precisely of truth. 
(Here and below I will typically use the word ‘fact’ non-factively to cover also possibilities 
which do not obtain. This use should not I hope give rise to confusion; it is present also in 
the Tractatus (see e.g. 2.1).) 
It is uncontroversial of course that Tractarian facts are the kinds of things to obtain, 
and that such obtaining is in some manner the matter of truth. But paralleling Frege means 
taking a more specific line. For one, Frege is not merely using the notion of truth to single 
out certain items – thoughts – in which he is interested. Rather, he is introducing the notion 
of a thought as the notion of something which may be true: a thought is precisely a possible 
truth. ‘The most appropriate name for a true thought,’ Frege says, ‘is a truth’ (Frege 1979: 
168). Similarly, I want to suggest, a Tractarian fact is not singled out merely as something 
whose obtaining makes for truth, something which as it happens plays a ‘truth-making role’, 
as do the facts of Russell’s 1910 correspondence theory. Rather, a fact is precisely a possible 
truth. The most appropriate name for an obtaining Tractarian fact is a truth.  
More than this though, there is also the inference of Frege’s second sentence. It 
follows from the pride of place he assigns to truth, Frege writes, that he does not begin with 
the parts of a thought and put them together to form the whole but comes by the parts of 
the thought only by analyzing the whole. How so? 
We can imagine a view of thoughts, or facts, under which these are essentially the 
kinds of things to be true, essentially things for which the question of truth arises, but which 
nonetheless have parts arrived at independently of the whole. According to such a view, 
whilst the parts are in themselves quite separate from any matter of truth, the manner of 
their combination makes truth internal to the whole: the ‘self-standing’ parts are combined in 
an essentially true-or-false manner to make an essentially true-or-false whole. Frege implies, 
however, that such a view would be contrary to his conception of logic. Why? Well, because 
the view proposes substance to the whole, the thought or fact, independent of the notion of 
truth. It is evident in Frege’s drawing the inference he does, from truth’s pride of place to 
parts arrived at only by analyzing the whole, that on his conception of logic truth has sole 
pride of place, where this means that no substance arrives into his theorising separately from 
that content. His theorising is in this sense nothing other than an unpacking of the notion of 
truth. So in particular no elaboration of his notion of a thought can be in view other than its 
unpacking as the notion of a truth or falsehood. And this means that the parts of a thought 
have no understanding other than as such. What a thought part is, exhaustively and from the 
start, is a part of thoughts. 
 It is for this same reason, I want to suggest, that Wittgenstein adopts his parallel 
conception of objects as essentially possible parts of facts. It is because he gives sole pride 
of place to the notion of truth, and so conceives of facts as nothing other than possible 
truths, that Wittgenstein comes by the parts of a fact only by analyzing the fact. It is for this 
reason that objects have no substance other than as fact elements. 
 
1.4 
Where are we? We rejected that the identity of limits between logic and the world is a thesis 
that representability and possibility are identical in extent, for such a thesis would depend for 
its intelligibility upon something Wittgenstein sees as ruled out by the identity, namely the 
specification of an object-combination which is not as such the specification of a possibility. 
Looking for an alternative understanding of the identity, we noted that an object-
combination’s being as such a possibility issues from a certain conception of fact and object, 
a conception which is in turn, I suggested, the result of the pride of place Wittgenstein 
ascribes in his theorising to truth. To understand the identity of limits, this implies, we need 
to understand its connection to truth’s pride of place. And what is necessary for this, I want 
now to say, is to put together our two uses of the word ‘logic’. As initially introduced in 
connection to 5.61, logic had to do with sense, to do with representability or sayability. In 
context with Frege, logic had to do with truth. Seeing these as two sides of the same coin 
will complete our understanding for now of 5.61. An obtaining possibility is nothing other 
than a truth: this explains the identity of limits between possibility and representability, for a 
truth or falsehood is as such a sense, and vice versa. 
A Fregean thought is essentially something to be thought, or more specifically it is 
essentially something to be grasped. But this does not mean, of course, that empirical 
subjects with their contingent powers and constraints are thereby internal to the nature of 
thoughts. That would be psychologism of a kind Frege rejects time and again. Rather, the 
thought’s essential graspability reflects only its status as a truth or falsehood. Indeed, it is the 
very same status. Being a truth or falsehood means being something for the understanding, 
and vice versa. A truth or falsehood is as such something to be understood, and what is 
understood is as such a truth or falsehood. More, in being exhaustively a truth or falsehood, 
in having no substance independent of truth, the thought is exhaustively something for the 
understanding, something wholly given to the understanding, something of which 
understanding is possession (more on this below). And the same connection between truth 
and thinkability is present also in Wittgenstein. Talk of representability or thinkability does 
not call for Wittgenstein for consideration of representing subjects, with their psychological 
powers and empirical constraints. He has no more interest than Frege in such matters. 
Rather, the thinkability or representability in which he is interested is precisely that of a truth 
or falsehood. 
To ascribe pride of place to truth, then, is to ascribe pride of place to the 
understanding, and so to representation. A fact, or way for things to be, is precisely 
something to be grasped. And in ascribing sole pride of place to truth, in allowing no 
substance from outside the understanding to figure within the understanding, no space is 
admitted for a division amongst ways for things to be between the possible and the 
impossible. That logic – truth, representability – doesn’t merely belong to the world but fills 
the world means that possibility and thinkability, fact and sense, are one and the same. (As 
Wittgenstein puts it, ‘One can say, instead of, This proposition has such and such a sense, 
This proposition represents such and such a state of affairs’ (4.031).) It means that 
‘metaphysical form’ – that is, an object’s essential possibilities for combining with other 
objects in atomic facts – is logical form. It means, that is to say, that the world’s limits are at 
once those of logic. 
 
 
PART 2: TLP 5.6 and 5.62 
 
2.1 
This account of section 5.61 is importantly incomplete, for no significant understanding has 
been provided of Wittgenstein’s conception of obtaining facts as truths. So far, the 
interpretation remains brute at this central point. Explanations of truth’s pride of place will be 
considered in the work ahead, but let’s turn now to sections 5.6 and 5.62. As Wittgenstein 
presents this pair, 5.6 states the key to the question in what way solipsism is a truth, and 5.62 
turns that key. 
 To begin, let’s consider and set aside a suggestion that 5.6 is to be explained as a 
consequence of 5.61. The limits of language mean the limits of the world: this expresses, we 
have said, a theoretical stance within which no distinction is available between the possible 
and the sensical. Turning then to 5.6 – ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world’ – this might be read as expressing a thought that no distinction is available for me, for 
the subject, between the possible and the sensical. And if that’s right, an explanatory move 
may seem available from 5.61 to 5.6. The subject makes no distinction between the sensical 
and the possible. Why not? Well, because there is no such distinction to be made.  
But there is a difficulty here of a kind which will recur below. Spelling out the mooted 
explanation, we shall have the following: There is no distinction to be made between the 
thinkable and the possible; so no one can make any such distinction; so in particular I can 
make no such distinction. This conclusion must surely fail as in interpretation of 5.6, however, 
for its ‘I’ is the instantiation of a variable ‘someone’, and as such serves to pick out one of an 
array, or potential array, of subjects. (‘No one φs’ = ‘It is not the case that someone φs’.) The 
subject has on this interpretation become a subject, one subject amongst (potential) others. 
But this can’t be right, for then no move will be available to 5.62. If 5.6 is to be the basis for 
the solipsist’s claim in 5.62 that the world is my world, its first person pronouns must match 
the pronoun of that claim. And whatever we make of ‘The world is my world’, this patently 
does not express a thought that the world belongs to a subject, to one subject amongst 
possible others. (The world is Ludwig’s world – lucky Ludwig!) 
 This reasoning may suggest that 5.6 and 5.61 should be treated as quite separate. 
The impersonality of 5.61 rules out, one might think, that it be understood by means of the 
first-personal 5.6. And understanding 5.6 by means of 5.61 involves treating its ‘my’ as the 
indexical name of a subject, and so barring any move to the claim in 5.62 that the world is 
my world. 5.6 and 5.61 must therefore stand as independent premises within an argument 
for solipsism. I shall reject this conclusion below, centrally by rejecting that the material of 
5.61 is as impersonal as it might first seem. (Indeed, it is not as impersonal as might be 
suggested by this essay’s strategy of beginning at 5.61 and only subsequently considering 
the first person pronoun.) But it will take us a while to arrive there. Let’s continue on, rather, 
by noting that throwing out the idea that 5.6 is a consequence of 5.61 does not mean 
throwing out the initial move which made space for it, namely the proposal to read 5.6 as 
expressing a thought that the subject does not distinguish between the sensical and the 
possible. Sticking as we may with that idea, let’s rather seek a different kind of explanatory 
context for it. 
 
2.2 
A division amongst senses between the possible and the merely sensical depends, we said, 
on the possession by a sense of truth-independent substance. Recasting this within the mind 
of the subject, we shall have that countenancing a division amongst senses between the 
possible and the merely sensical depends upon the ascription to a sense of truth-
independent substance. The subject’s distinguishing amongst senses between the possible 
and the merely sensical – ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that’ – depends upon her 
ascribing truth-independent substance to the content of her thoughts. And this she cannot 
do. She makes no sense, I shall suggest, of there being substance to what she thinks going 
beyond in kind what is available to her within her thinking – substance, that is, beyond truth 
and falsehood. 
 This suggestion depends upon an idea of understanding as possession: in grasping 
that p, the subject is possessed of that which she grasps. Where the subject understands that 
p, she knows herself to understand that p, and so she knows that what she understands is 
that p. In understanding, the subject is not merely related to a certain content as Jack might 
be related to Jill by being taller than her. Rather, the content of the subject’s understanding, 
and that she understands that content, is given to her, possessed by her, in her act of 
understanding. This point may seem straightforward enough: the subject does not need a 
further act beyond her understanding in order to know herself to understand what she does. 
Still, it might be questioned, or at least qualified. Yes, someone might say, the subject is 
indeed possessed in thinking of the true-or-false content that she thinks. So much is indeed 
given to her, transparent to her, merely in thinking. But there is nonetheless further 
substance to what the subject thinks, deeper substance which goes beyond in kind that 
which is given to her in her thought. What is given to the subject in thought, the truth-or-
falsity, is the mere tip of the sense iceberg whose full nature encompasses the truth-
independent substance of the sense’s constituent objects. 
The thought of 5.6, I want to suggest, is that this supposition of a ‘deeper content’ is 
not something of which the subject can herself make sense. The subject might, perhaps, 
essay the idea that she is related in her thinking to objects with a life outside truth, and so a 
life beyond in kind what is possessed by her in her understanding. She is thinking here about 
this thing. But any such idea – ‘I think here of this’ – will itself be simply a fact whose content 
available to her in thinking it will be without truth-independent substance. For what she self-
consciously thinks – what she knowingly grasps – will be simply another truth or falsehood. 
And the thought here is quite general. There is no move for the subject by which she can 
‘get outside’ her understanding in such a way as to recognise a ‘deeper content’ to what she 
understands, a content going beyond in kind that which she possesses in her understanding. 
Any such attempt at recognition will be simply another move of her understanding, and as 
such deliver for her only something again of the same kind. 
Recognising this, the subject sees the quest for ‘truth-independent substance’ as 
misconceived. The idea of fulfilling the quest is the contradictory idea of recognising 
something unrecognizable, of possessing something unpossessable. ‘I make no sense,’ she 
thus concludes, ‘of my objects, the things about which I think, outrunning in their substance 
that which is given to me within my thought.’ Or again: ‘The limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world’. 
	
2.3 
Care needs to be taken in understanding this line of thought. To see why, recall our concern 
above to avoid seeing 5.6 as an instantiation of a generalization that there is no distinction 
available to a subject, to subjects, between the thinkable and the possible. If 5.6 instantiates 
such a generalization, then its first person pronoun will serve to pick out one amongst an 
array (or would-be array) of subjects, and so cannot serve to express the solipsism in view in 
5.62. (More, we suggested that such a reading would be inevitable if we tried to understand 
5.6 as a consequence of 5.61.) Have we now avoided what we said must be avoided? 
 Well, not if the reasoning is to work as follows. First premise: I make no sense of 
what I think having substance going beyond in kind that which I grasp in thinking it. Second 
premise: what I grasp in thinking something is precisely a truth or falsehood. So conclusion: I 
make no sense of what I think having truth-independent substance. For insofar as the second 
premise here introduces a notion of truth not present in the first premise, the claim that what 
I grasp is a truth-or-falsehood will necessarily be the consequence of a generalization that 
what subjects in general grasp, or possess, are truth-or-falsehoods. (If the notion of truth is 
independent of considerations as to what I grasp and make sense of, then the fact that what 
I grasp is a truth will not be explicable by reference to me, but must issue instead from 
considerations as to what subjects in general grasp.) And this will then infect the whole 
passage of reasoning: if the ‘I’ of the second premise is the name of one of an array of 
subjects, then for the reasoning to run so too must be the ‘I’s of the first premise. And so we 
shall arrive at an interpretation under which Wittgenstein’s thought in 5.6 is that a certain 
subject, Ludwig, makes no sense of what he, Ludwig, thinks having truth-independent 
substance. 
 But this is not what the reasoning was to be. More specifically, the reasoning did not 
call on any independent second premise as above, separate from the first. To see why not, 
let’s consider why, in understanding that p, the subject knows herself to understand that p, 
and so knows that what she understands is that p. Why by contrast does the subject not 
know in being taller than Jack that she is taller than Jack? The immediate response here is 
that the subject knows in the act of understanding that she so acts, because her so acting is 
a determination of herself, the subject. The subject’s knowledge of her understanding is self-
knowledge of a kind distinct from any knowledge she might have of being taller than Jack.  
The thought here of self-knowledge is not the thought, however, that because the 
subject’s understanding that p is a determination of herself, the subject has some kind of 
special access to it, or has a special guarantee of knowledge. That would again involve 
seeing the subject here as a subject: special access or guarantee mean access or guarantee 
not enjoyed by another. (‘This subject here – the ‘I’ subject, the one I have special access 
to/guaranteed knowledge of – understands that p’.) Rather, the thought is that the subject’s 
determinations are given to her essentially as her determinations, essentially as herself, 
where this means that they are not given as something which might be known ‘from another 
perspective’ other than as such. As they are known, there is no possibility of ‘hiving off’ their 
first-personality to give the shape of a situation which might be known in another manner. 
For this to be so would be for the subject to be a subject. 
And if this is right, the subject’s failure to make sense of content to her thinking 
going beyond in kind that which she possesses in thinking it will be a failure to make sense 
of content to her thinking which goes beyond herself. What the subject possesses is 
essentially a self-determination: this is the basic kind of that which I possess. So where I 
make no sense of the content of my thinking having a nature which goes beyond in kind that 
which I possess in thinking it, I make no sense of what I think being something separable 
from myself. My thinking, and with that what I think, is essentially a determination of myself. 
And this means that there are no distinct first and second premises as above. The thought is 
not that what I grasp is essentially a graspable, i.e. a truth: but what’s that? Rather, it is that 
what I grasp is essentially something graspable by me. I make no sense of what I think 
having a deeper content different in kind from that which I possess, but no external or 
impersonal characterization is now to be given of that which I possess: a truth, a possibility, 
whatever. Rather, it is fundamentally as something I possess, as something I grasp, that I 
grasp something. And what I make no sense of is content beyond here: I make no sense of 
content beyond possessability by me. 
 The reasoning of the last section is thus run entirely in an undistancable first person, 
in a first person which is not and cannot be the instantiation of a third-personal 
generalization. There is no thought present here that I make no sense of what a certain 
subject – the ‘me subject’ – thinks having content outrunning that which is given to her – that 
is, to me – in thinking. The thought is rather that I make no sense of what I think outrunning 
that which I possess. And its avowal can be made only in the first person: the limits of my 
language mean the limits of my world. 
 
2.4 
Section 5.6 provides the key to the truth in solipsism, and in 5.62 Wittgenstein presents the 
turning of this key as more or less effortless. We are given only this: 
 
The world is my world: this shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the 
language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (5.62) 
 
An obvious point for the interpreter to focus on here is Wittgenstein’s apparent identification 
of the limits of the language with the limits of the language which alone I understand. 
Connecting to 5.6, this is, apparently, an identification between the limits of the language 
and the limits of my language. Such an identification certainly promises to take us to the 
solipsist’s conclusion. If the limits of my language mean the limits of my world (5.6) and the 
limits of the language mean the limits of the world (5.61), then if the limits of my language 
are the limits of the language we shall have both that the limits of the language mean the 
limits of my world and that the limits of the world mean the limits of my world. The world will 
be my world. Indeed, identifying the limits of the language and the limits of my language is 
surely not only sufficient but also necessary for the solipsist’s conclusion. Without this, we 
shall have only identities with the first person pronoun on both sides, or identities with the 
first person pronoun on neither side (see Sullivan 1996: 195). 
 There is good reason, however, to reject this perspective from which the 
understanding and justification of a ‘cross-identification’ appears the crucial matter for 
interpretation. For as Wittgenstein presents to his reader, the ‘cross-identification’ of 
language and my language discernible in 5.62 is not the key to solipsism. Indeed, it is not 
even a key, an additional key to work alongside that of 5.6. Rather, 5.6 is the key, and what 
identification there is to be found in 5.62 of language and my language is something 
indicated only in passing by means of parenthesis. Taking this appearance seriously 
provides, furthermore, a rather different perspective. On the one hand section 5.6 is, 
Wittgenstein says, the key: nothing substantially new is adduced in 5.62. On the other hand 
it is quite right that we arrive at solipsism only by means of a claim that the language is my 
language. So it must be that this claim is already present in section 5.6. 
In fact, the presence in 5.6 of an identity between language and my language is the 
central point we made just above in response to the concern of impersonality, the concern 
that the subject of 5.6 is a subject. If there were an independent notion of truth in play in 5.6, 
so that it is as such a truth or falsity that I grasp something, then a very good question would 
indeed arise of why the limits of my language, the range of truth and falsity that I think, the 
possibilities for truth and falsity contained in the objects about which I think, should be the 
limits of the language, the possibilities for truth and falsity in general. I may make no sense 
of a deeper content to that which I possess in thinking, no sense of truth-independent 
substance. But how am I to rule out the possibility of wider content. How am I to rule out, 
that is, the possibility that what I think is a proper sub-space only of the space of truth and 
falsity? Here we do indeed need an extra premise that the language is my language, that 
language does not extend beyond mine, and it is very hard to see where this premise might 
come from. Once we recognise, however, that 5.6 does not draw on an external notion of 
truth, that its notion of truth is not something independent of graspability by me, then we 
may recognise a single key whose turning is as straightforward as Wittgenstein suggests. 
It is as something I possess, as a determination of myself, that I possess something, 
and the thought of 5.6 is that I make no sense of what I think (my world) having substance 
independent of its possessability by me (my language). But as we have emphasized enough, 
the phrase ‘possessability by me’ does not instantiate a variable ‘possessability by x’. Rather, 
it is an essentially first personal idiom. Possessability by me precisely does not, then, 
implicate the idea of a potentially wider space of possessability simpliciter (possessability by 
a subject), a potentially wider space of truth, a potentially wider space of language. Rather, 
the truth in play in 5.6 is essentially linked to me, it means as much as: a determination of 
me. (The understanding is my understanding.) So it is already there, already present, in 5.6 
that language is my language, that the limits of language mean the limits of that which I 
understand. And so the key is indeed effortlessly turned. I make no sense of that which I 
understand having truth-independent substance – an obtaining fact is a truth. And truth 
means as much as possessability by me. So the space of possible fact is nothing other than 




PART 3: TLP 5.63s and 5.64s 
 
3.1 
We rejected above the possibility of an inference from 5.61 to 5.6. Attempting such a move 
would mean treating the subject as a subject, and so preventing any arrival in 5.62 at an 
engaging solipsism. It might now seem, however, that we have given an explanation in the 
opposite direction, from 5.6 to 5.61. The subject makes no sense of content to her thinking 
going beyond in kind that which she possesses in thinking. This was our understanding of 
5.6. And it is this, it might now seem, which explains truth’s pride of place. ´Truth’ means 
precisely that which the subject possesses. And with no sense being made of substance 
beyond such truth, the rejection of truth-independent substance expressed in 5.61 becomes 
a consequence of 5.6. 
 Carefully understood, this view is I think correct. But care is indeed needed, for the 
position may seem alarmingly idealist. Truth and logic, it may seem, have become a mere 
reflection of me, the subject. The nature of truth is explained by reference to that of the 
subject. The core message of what Wittgenstein goes on to say in the 5.63s and 5.64s is that 
no such reflecting or explaining is in fact in play. There is no such idealism. Truth is not 
founded in the subject. 
 
3.2 
The substance of this message is delivered through Wittgenstein’s treatment of the 
metaphor of the eye and its visual field.2 He writes: 
 
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this 
case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the 
eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an 
eye.  




Wittgenstein doesn’t reject the comparison outright between the eye and its visual field and 
the subject and its world, and he doesn’t endorse it outright either. His principle concern is 
rather to repudiate a certain understanding of the metaphor, an understanding embodied in 
a tendency to draw the picture of 5.6331. 
 There are two things wrong with the picture, Wittgenstein says. First, it places the 
eye within the visual field. This is an obvious mistake: the visual field is constituted by that 
which is seen by the eye, and the eye does not see itself. Or moving the mistake across to 
the subject and its world, the subject is not something within its world, an empirical object 
discernable there amongst others (c.f. 5.631). The subject is not something I speak or think 
about, an element of content for me. This is in effect our point above that the subject is not a 
subject. Rather, the subject is that whose range of determinations constitute its world. Or as 
Wittgenstein now puts it, ‘I am my world’ (5.63). In saying this, though, we threaten to run 
into the second mistake Wittgenstein identifies with the drawing of the visual field. ‘From 
nothing in the field of sight,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘can it be concluded that it is seen from an 
																																																								
2 My discussion here is heavily influenced by Sullivan 1996. 
eye’ (5.633). But insofar as the field and the eye are two sides of the same coin, surely 
everything in the field allows inference to the eye! 
 The inference from the field to the eye is indicated in the picture of 5.6331 by the 
field’s having a boundary whose shape focuses in on a certain point, the position of the eye. 
And reflecting the apparent necessity of such an inference is the fact that there is surely 
nothing wrong with this shape. In drawing a visual field, we surely must draw a line whose 
shape draws in towards the position of the eye. But still, Wittgenstein says, this is not the 
form of the field of sight. How so? These problems are I think set here by Wittgenstein as 
parallel: how can I not be concluded from my world, and how can the eye not be concluded 
from its field? And a key message within this pair of sections, a key point of Wittgenstein’s 
introduction of the metaphor, is that these parallel questions have parallel responses. 
Whilst we can fuss about the exact position of the eye vis-à-vis the boundary when 
we draw the visual field, there is no getting away from the fact that insofar as we are drawing 
a visual field, we shall be drawing something which sets the location of the eye and in doing 
so speaks of the eye. And this is not something Wittgenstein wants to deny. His point is not 
that there is something wrong with the picture, that the picture needs to be changed so as 
to remove the suggestion of an inference from field to eye. His point is rather that the artist 
makes a mistake in drawing a picture at all. There is, Wittgenstein is saying, no picture to be 
drawn of the visual field. We can of course draw a visual field, an eye with a line showing the 
boundary of those things within its range. And insofar as this is a generic picture as opposed 
to a picture of a particular eye and its particular field, we can if we like call it a picture of the 
visual field. Crucially, though, and this is I think Wittgenstein’s central point, any such 
drawing will necessarily involve a distancing by the artist of the eye. The visual field, that is to 
say, will necessarily not be drawn from the perspective of the drawn eye but from a different 
perspective, from a perspective outside the eye. Or again, in drawing the eye and its field, 
the artist necessarily looks down on them. Any attempt to avoid such looking down, to draw 
the field from perspective the eye, must fail: there is simply no drawing possible here, no 
lines the artist can make on the paper (c.f. Sullivan 1996 p198). (And conversely, where the 
artist is able to hold the eye at a distance, there will be no barrier to a drawing. Indeed, fuss 
about the exact location of the eye to one side, the artist will immediate produce the picture 
of 5.6331.) 
 An inference from its field to the eye is avoided, I’m suggesting, only by refusing to 
offer any drawing, where this is equivalent to refusing to treat the eye at a distance. And 
transferring across the metaphor, the thought will be that an inference from its world to the 
subject is avoided by recognising that such an inference both depends upon, and is the 
immediate consequence of, a distancing of the subject. Insofar as the inference is indeed a 
mistake, so too is the would-be distancing, and vice versa. 
 We have talked enough above about the undistanceability of the subject, about the 
subject’s not being a subject. Wittgenstein now calls the subject, the self of self-knowledge, 
the ‘metaphysical subject’ (5.633, 5.641) or again the ‘philosophical I’ (5.641). And there is, 
he says, no inference to this I from what it possesses, its world or determinations. But the 
puzzle remains here of how there is no such inference. Merely invoking the visual field 
metaphor is not in itself an explanation. Yes, the self is not distanced. But the problem 
remains: where I am my world, how can I not be concluded from my world? How can there 
be no inference from its world to the subject? 
 
3.3 
Let’s shift to think in terms of content, loosely conceived. A drawing of the visual field is 
made with lines. And these lines have meaning, they indicate something: they express 
content, and so difference. Here, this stuff, is in the field; there, this other, is not. Such a 
drawing is immediately available of the distanced eye and its field: distancing the eye and its 
field means, precisely, seeing something from a distance, and so having material for a 
drawing. And the converse is also true: having something to draw, finding content to the eye 
and its field, means distancing the eye. Lines can be drawn, content found, only from a 
perspective other than that of the eye. Following the metaphor, the thought will then be that 
the undistanced subject and her world will as such be empty of content. And with this 
thought we find an answer – though perhaps an enigmatic one – to the question how there 
is no inference from the world to its subject. There is no inference because there is no 
content to which an inference can be made, or indeed content from which an inference can 
be made. The subject is indeed the internal unity of its world, the unity of truth, but the 
undistanced unity is an empty unity, a unity empty of content, a unity without contrast.  
 The idea of a contentless subject is evident in the following section 5.634: 
 
This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori. 
Everything we see could also be otherwise.  
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.  
There is no order of things a priori. 
 
Where as I am my world, any content to me would be an a priori necessity for me, content 
given to me merely in thinking. In thinking, the subject’s determinations are given to her as 
such. So any content to her determinations would be content to her world, that is content to 
the world, given to her merely in thinking. The subject would know merely in thinking that 
the world has this character, the character of herself. But there is, Wittgenstein is insisting, no 
character to the subject and her world. And so there is no such knowledge, no such a priori 
order. But still, whence this insistence? So far, the emptiness of the subject is the product 
only of the application by Wittgenstein of a certain metaphor, the transferal across a 
metaphor of the idea that there is no drawing the field from the perspective of the eye. But 
why should the metaphor apply? 
 Well, here we need to look back to 5.6 and 5.62. The application of the metaphor of 
the eye and its field is not the development of a substantially new picture for Wittgenstein; 
rather, the applicability of the metaphor is implicit already within the fact that the limits of my 
language mean the limits of my world. 
  Finding content to the subject and her world means making a contrast between the 
subject’s world and ‘not the subject’s world’, a contrast between the subject’s world and 
what lies outside that world, the range of determinations known to the subject in being so 
determined. It means, that is to say, being in position to draw a contentful line, a picture of 
the subject’s world. Or again, it means saying that the subject’s world has this in it, and this, 
but not that. As rehearsed in part 1, however, saying that the world of possibilities has this in 
it, and this, but not that, depends upon finding possibility-independent substance to the 
world. And saying that the subject’s world has this in it, and this, but not that, will depend 
upon finding substance to the subject’s world independent of the subject, substance to the 
subject’s determinations independent of their being the subject’s determinations. Just as 
finding content to the space of possibility so that we can say that this is possible but not this 
depends upon finding substance independent of possibility, so too finding content to the 
space of the subject’s determinations depends upon finding substance independent of those 
determinations, substance independent of the subject. Our elaboration above of 5.6 
centrally involved, however, the idea that finding content independent of herself is precisely 
what the subject does not do. I make no sense of the supposition that what I think outruns in 
its content that which I possess in thinking: the limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world. The subject makes no sense of substance beyond herself. But this means at the same 
time, we’re now underlining, that she makes no sense of substance to herself. Finding no 
substance beyond the subject means at the same time finding no substance to the subject. 
The undistanced subject of 5.6 is thus as such an empty subject. 
 
3.4 
Wittgenstein expresses this thought in 5.64 by saying that ‘the I in solipsism shrinks to an 
extensionless point’. More fully he writes: 
 
5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I 
in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated 
with it. 
 
And with this, the solipsism story of the Tractatus is effectively closed. So where are we? 
 At the start of this third part of the essay, we entertained the thought that in 
explicating truth by reference to the subject, the solipsist has cast truth as a reflection of the 
subject, that the solipsist has explained the nature of truth, the nature of sense, by reference 
to that of the subject. And this is indeed precisely what would have happened if there were 
content to the solipsist’s I. ‘Sense is what I make sense of’, ‘A possibility is a determination of 
this, of me’ – said with appropriate emphases. But this is not what has happened. Indeed, it 
cannot be what has happened, for such an explanation would immediately undermine itself. 
Where substance is ascribed to the subject, substance is imputed beyond the subject, with 
the result that there will be no pride of place for the subject, and so for truth. Section 5.61 
will thus have been not explained but falsified. 
 Our reasoning in part 2 did not entail, however, an explanation from the nature of 
the subject to that of truth: it merely ruled out that truth be independent of the subject. It is 
as something I possess, as a determination of myself, that I think something. And I make no 
sense of content beyond here, of content independent of possessability by me. From here 
truth will indeed need to be explained as possessability by me. But this explanation will not 
be of a substantial nature through reference to a substantial explanans, an idealist 
explanation of the nature of truth by reference to that of the subject and her powers, for in 
making no sense of content independent of the subject, I at the same time make no sense of 
content to the subject. What we shall have, rather, is an explication of truth as identical, in its 
emptiness, to the subject. As Wittgenstein puts it, we shall have not an idealism but a 
coincidence of solipsism with pure realism. The suggestion in solipsism of an idealism, of an 
explanation from the subjective, from what is given to and so belongs to the subject, to the 
objective, to what is characterized by truth, is illusory. Rather, solipsism, thought through, 
coincides with realism. Truth’s pride of place is not derivative from a deeper pride of place of 
the subject, but is underivative. 
 From part 1 we wanted an understanding of truth’s pride of place. By the end of part 
2 we arrived at a suggestion that this is explained as reflecting something more fundamental 
than truth, namely the subject. And in part 3 we have seen this mooted explanation collapse 
as incoherent. In recognising this collapse, however, we at the same time gain the proper 
understanding of what would be explained. Truth’s pride of place is not mere dogma. Nor is 
it explained by reference to something else, the subject. Rather, it is to be understood in its 
coincidence with the emptiness of the subject. The necessity of truth’s pride of place is to be 
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